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Ideology and policy: notes on the shaping of the Internet by Katharine 
Sarikakis 
This paper considers some of the ideologies that are shaping Internet 
policies. It addresses the priorities of international policy initiatives 
and identifies their discursive constructions. It takes stock of some of 
the most characteristic policy directions that seek to define the Internet 
and its uses within an agenda of predominant privatisation. 
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Introduction 
Given increased international interest in information technologies — 
thanks in part to the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) — 
it is useful to trace the ideological constructions of policies affecting 
the future of interactive communications. This paper considers the 
relationship between Internet policy and the impact of broader social 
issues in an economic and political environment that is becoming 
increasingly globalised. Not only procedural and organisational factors, 
but also an underlying philosophy about the purpose and function of 
the Internet undermine efforts for a public policy with redistributive 
aims. In fact, the rhetoric used to justify choices distorts the 
deliberations of a debate in favour of policy with socially responsible 
objectives (McNutt, 2003). 
  
 
Between potential and purpose 
Beyond a medium of communication, the Internet represents a very 
particular and significant technology where interactivity and 
networking constitute its most exciting traits. Speed and borderlessness 
turn the Internet into a supermedium of contemporary times. Most 
importantly, the Internet's dynamic infrastructure — based on 
decentralised communication nodes and points of entry into already 
existent spaces (Web sites, chatrooms, archives and specialised portals) 
— offers possibilities for the construction of new spaces. The 
theoretically infinite networking capability and storage capacity add to 
the utmost winning qualities of a medium that can be used in multiple 
levels, ways and for a variety of purposes. This ‘world of opportunity’ 
and potential presents many qualities mostly valued by cyberactivists 
and educators, but also by many in the world of trade and finance. 
Given the dynamics of the medium, the debate around the future of 
Internet can be easily directed toward an over–admiration of its 
technological characteristics. Hence generated deterministic ideas 
about the force of this technology have infiltrated not only the world of 
computer ‘nerds’ but also political and social worlds. These ideological 
constructions are obvious in policy proposals articulated in national 
and international policy forums, think tanks and even prophesying 
literature (see Kroker and Kroker, 1999). 
 
Inevitability is one major component in this construction. It refers not 
only to the inevitability of technological development, but also to 
activities designed to respond to the technologies in question, such as 
de–skilling and re–skilling of the work force and the associated 
provisions for ‘lifelong learning’ (Sarikakis and Terzis, 2000) or the 
further privatisation of functions of the state (Cameron and Palan, 2004) 
as part of an unavoidable and necessary strategy that addresses 
technology in its capacity to generate business. The world of business 
— or in the language of policy–making, the private sector — is 
therefore attended to, not as a factor influential on the very direction of 
technological development and use but as a necessary partner. As 
Kroker and Kroker (1999) observe "there is nothing more relentlessly 
ideological than the apparently anti–ideological rhetoric of information 
technology." The supposedly ‘interwoven’ fields of business and 
Internet are presented as an inescapable but also neutral — almost 
natural — relationship. The obvious example of this normative 
construction is exemplified in the inclusion of the private sector in the 
public policy–making process. The Okinawa Charter on Global 
Information Society clearly states "the private sector plays a leading 
role in the development of information and communications networks 
in the information society" [1]. It further declares the decision of the 
eight powerful countries to continue the "promotion of market–driven 
standards" [2]. Similarly, the World Summit on Information Society 
presents the decision to include businesses in the policy–making 
process as a factual observation that the sector is among the 
stakeholders and therefore a natural partner. Furthermore, the 
participation of the private sector is claimed to be necessary, as it 
constitutes an important partner in development efforts. In this context, 
it is similar to policies designed by the EU or the U.S., where 
corporation– or market–driven technological development is not 
addressed as a process where social relations are reflected, but is 
presented rather as almost ‘accidental’ and therefore ideology–free 
output, beyond the domains of interests. Williams and Edge (1996) 
noted the intervention of these factors upon two intersecting areas: 
content of technology and the innovation process. 
As Russell (2001) noted, policies that initially shaped the technological 
development and the use of the Internet were based on ideas of 
decentralisation and non–hierarchical definitions of the medium. In a 
way, the purposes of the medium defined its development and use: it 
would provide the American military a great degree of flexibility of 
communications if command centres were destroyed in a nuclear 
attack. The decentralising ideals behind the Internet found a fertile 
ground within the military and scientific complex. The developmental 
phase was achieved under a normative construction of five intersecting 
ideas governing different stages of the process. These ideas shaped 
policy in the early years of the Internet: 
"Basic research would drive the system; 
commercialization and the creation of new markets 
should follow "almost automatically" government 
investments in basic research; the control of science 
through legislation was of less importance than 
promoting the growth of scientific research; technology 
would play a crucial role in foreign policy, to maintain 
military superiority and as an enabler of free trade; and 
the ideological support for the consensus came with the 
widespread faith in the progress of science and 
understanding that the "growth of federal research 
served everybody’s interests — universities, 
government agencies, industry, [and] congressional 
committees."" (Smith, 1990 in Russell, 2001) 
The collaboration of the military and scientific community was 
encouraged through a climate of ideological consensus. As Hart (1998) 
noted, figures in American politics and economics "forged" a 
consensus throughout the course of the twentieth century. This 
consensus, built upon a number of normative constructions, ranging 
from "associationalism" to the New Deal liberalism.  
The twenty–first century is witnessing a new period of policies 
designed to secure the ‘occupied territories’ of the Internet, after the 
‘trial’ period, where Internet use for (marginalised) not–for–profit 
purposes proved the success of the technology. As it is most often the 
case with innovations, and especially the communication technologies 
of broadcasting, the marginalised civic sector has taken the new 
technology "forward before the corporate world figures out exactly the 
ways in which it can turn them into profit making instruments" 
(McChesney, 1996). The ideological and normative constructions of 
policy–making for the Internet express a form of neo–liberalist 
determinism that can be categorised in three major narratives: 
technological determinism, economic and structural inevitability and 
the ideology of private–public partnership, asserting the involvement 
of the private sector in public policy. 
Currently, the domination of commercialised content and services has 
a diminishing effect on the strategic organisation of the Internet for 
civic engagement and education. Just like securing newly ‘conquered’ 
colonial spaces through the re–organisation of space and 
administration through a legitimatisation process, so does the Internet 
become re–defined and re–organised as a borderless and timeless 
trading space. The commercialisation of the Internet is being well–
documented, because market surveys are inherent in this process. Thus, 
it is estimated that by 2007, consumers will account for 60 percent of 
all Internet traffic generated (NUA Internet Surveys, 2003). Despite 
the fact that the commercialisation of the Internet is defined and 
structured by policy at various levels, the logic of profit–making is 
used as a self–evident priority. It is presented as a driving force in the 
fate of the technology and its adoption, in a model similar to the 
development of commercial communications in the U.S. and Canada 
(McChesney 1996; Winseck 1998). Media policies in general, and 
Internet ones in particular, are absent from the public debate. The 
WSIS is hardly discussed in mainstream media, despite the fact that it 
constitutes an event of enormous significance for the future of world 
communications and related rights (Raboy, 2003). Despite the fact that 
numerous representatives of NGOs and civil society attended the first 
phase of the Summit, their involvement in the articulation of policy 
agenda has been seriously undermined through procedural architecture. 
It is worth mentioning that the private sector is guaranteed a seat and 
voice in the negotiations alongside the elected governments of nation 
states: 
"b) The commitment of the private sector is important 
in developing and diffusing information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), for infrastructure, 
content and applications. The private sector is not only a 
market player but also plays a role in a wider 
sustainable development context.  
c) The commitment and involvement of civil society is 
equally important in creating an equitable Information 
Society, and in implementing ICT–related initiatives for 
development." (World Summit on Information Society, 
2003) 
The private representation of interests by states and private sector is 
the outcome of an ideology that recognises the right of the private 
sector to be involved in decision–making processes, unaccountable to 
citizens — or even consumers — or states. The unbalanced 
representation of states in world policy summits (G8, WIPO, WTO, for 
example), due to a variety of factors and conditions, undermines even 
further the legitimacy of international processes and raises questions 
about their genuine consideration of public interests. 
  
 
Public policy bytes 
Policy frameworks surrounding the Internet can be divided into two 
categories: those policies designed to deal specifically with matters 
arising from the possibilities of the Internet as a new technology; and, 
those policies designed to address issues related to a number of 
contextual conditions that are not exclusive to the Internet, generally 
called information society policies. 
The "information society" (IS) is an ill–defined term that refers to the 
emergence of a society (that is, the organisation of relations) where 
information is the commodity and the product. This term has been used 
to define global policies within the context of ongoing global 
negotiations of the WSIS. As a policy object and discursive 
construction, the IS expresses the technocratic and market–focused 
visions of governments and businesses. These visions are not 
necessarily compatible with those of the civil society that calls for 
"information societies," a term identifying political and social life of 
the twenty–first century (APC, 2003). 
Interestingly, policies directly and exclusively dealing with the Internet 
are limited, compared to the enormous literature circulated by activists, 
analysts and scholars. One of the areas that attracts a great deal of 
attention by national and international policy–makers deals with the 
protection of profit–making activities. These are not limited to 
transactions over the Internet but encompass ‘real’ trade as well as 
virtual transactions, with anti–piracy measures being at the centre of 
concern by both transnational corporations and international policy–
makers at meetings scheduled by WIPO, WTO, and G8 as well as 
WSIS. 
Within this context, security constitutes a powerful keyword for the 
normative justification of a variety of state actions, from military 
action in the face of specifically defined forms of violence to the 
protection of trade spaces against practices that undermine the 
authority of the market. The construction of moral panics about the 
dangers of the Internet comes with specially designed software 
packages to make the cybermarket safer for navigation. Security 
touches upon the sensitive chords of human instincts of survival and 
protection, in particular when it brings children to the centre of such 
campaigns. The protection of vulnerable groups, such as children, is a 
policy object of the EU in restricting harmful content (European 
Parliament and Council of Europe, 1999). Although the interest of the 
EU in restricting such content is one of the characteristics of Internet 
policy that distinguish the EU from the U.S. (Franda, 2001), it mainly 
stresses the importance of self–regulation, depending almost 
exclusively on a model of socially responsible industry. The definition 
of what constitutes "harmful content" is neither clear nor conclusive; 
the assumption most widely accepted is that hate speech and child 
pornography are considered harmful content. Laws tend to be unclear 
or unwilling to deal with the pornographic industry on the Internet, 
despite some provisions against the depiction of non–consensual sex 
and sexual abuse. There are ongoing debates questioning pornography 
as a matter of free expression and examining relationships between 
virtual and physical crimes (Huff, et al., 2003; University of Michigan, 
1995) [3]. Nevertheless, the hate language and images accompanying 
pornographic sites — targeting women — do not seem to present 
problems to those profiting from the Internet. Although a thorough 
discussion of these trends is beyond the purpose of this paper, it is 
worth noting that a number of "respectable" telecommunication 
companies are now joining up with pornographic portals to boost the 
sales and use of new generation GSM telephones (Sarikakis, 2004). As 
these profitable collaborations increase, the industry become more 
"proactive" in self–regulating provisions surrounding new services. For 
example, recently one of the biggest telecommunication operators 
drafted a code of conduct that would protect children from adult 
content on GSM phones (Wray, 2004). Historically, this is similar to 
the early days of the cinema, where women and young people would 
use the movie theatres as places to socialise; an industry–based group, 
the Kinematograph Manufacturers Association, administered the 
censoring board (Eldridge, et al., 1997). In both cases, the industry is 
first and foremost concerned with the protection of its interests in a 
newly acquired territory. The option of being subjected to state and 
social control is less appealing than keeping the "house tidy" through 
self–regulation. 
In Europe, the information society became an umbrella term under 
which issues related to the exploitation and commercialisation of new 
media (including broadcasting developments) were addressed. The 
European Commission (1993), although exaggerating the potential for 
new jobs and trade and industry growth, primarily focused on the 
economic dimensions of new communications technologies. The 
information society, as envisioned by the EU, expressed conflicting 
visions of Europe as a space of national and supranational activities, 
summoned around corporate interests and a regionally universalised 
community. It was explicitly stated that the welfare practices — a great 
European tradition — could no longer be followed (Cameron and 
Palan, 2004; European Commission, 1993). Therefore, the welfare 
state was replaced by corporate competition with a limited role for 
citizens in the information society. 
  
 
Policies of liberation, policies of control 
The prospect of the Internet to further develop as an anarchic, 
hierarchy–free space of political and cultural action, and as an 
educational and information–geared medium, is subsiding with the 
increased control of companies and states over its infrastructure and 
technology. Increasingly, free distribution and sharing of information 
and knowledge resources on the Internet is criminalised, reducing the 
potential of emancipatory uses of this medium. WIPO’s own agenda 
revolves around the commercialisation of copyrights and intellectual 
property, which, under the current conditions of distribution and 
production, benefits mainly corporations. This control over content and 
infrastructure is at odds with a medium that began as a facilitator of 
open information exchange. As Bonetti (2003) noted, "intellectual 
property has become strongly connected to electronic commerce." The 
visions of a liberating coexistence of humans and machines differ from 
Bill Gates’ perspective of human assistants using communication 
systems in the service of business (Gates, 1999). 
 
The very production of technology has often shifted from "describing 
the user to configuring the user" (Cockburn and Ruza, 1994). There are 
parallels in the development of e–commerce policies, seeking to 
configure Internet users into a corporate model of consumers, 
accepting an Internet based on paid–for content. Above all, copyright–
related issues are heavily lobbied by media transnationals that do not 
hesitate to sue even children who exchange products through peer-to-
peer programmes (Martell and Stevenson, 2003). As a result, policies 
are being designed predominantly not to regulate economy, but to 
regulate individual behaviour (Cameron and Pala, 2004). These trends 
echo some of the ideas of Aglietta (1979) and others that argue that a 
regime of accumulation corresponds to a regime of regulation. Broadly 
speaking, that regime aims at controlling individual and institutional 
behaviour in order that the regime of accumulation (production, labour 
relations) can be accepted. In the Internet case, policies increasingly 
tend to aim at regulating consumerist behaviour, that of end–receivers 
and end–users. "Intellectual property law is increasingly concerned 
with private behaviour — whereas the consumption and use of 
copyrighted material was previously concerned with public actions or 
actions of consumption in public" (Bonetti 2003). 
Any discussion related to the information revolution and the expansion 
of the Internet is directly linked to the "liberalization" of 
telecommunications. In a similar and subsequent way, privacy rights 
are seriously undermined and become subject to the economic viability 
or value of a traded services or products. Moreover, the rhetoric of new 
technologies invents new regulatory definitions. The notion of privacy 
undergoes a re–definition and its criterion becomes, not standards for 
dignity and respect of individuals, but the potential damage to profit–
making, caused by personal use of products. The regulation of private 
behaviour is becoming an inherent part of Internet regulation, with 
attention being predominantly focused on the wrongdoings of 
individuals. Indeed, market strategies are dominant, without regard to 
improve the material conditions of many on the planet, largely those 
concentrated in the developing world (Sarikakis and Terzis, 2000). 
These priorities are based on the fact that most of the use of the 
Internet is concentrated in the developed world (Eurobarometer, 2000). 
  
 
Digital divide and social exclusion 
Social exclusion has become a popular term and is widely used by 
policy–makers and civil society actors alike. The term is used to 
express the inequalities in the information society and is often used in 
conjunction with the term "digital divide," which refers to the gap 
between the "haves" and "have–nots" of the digital age. Both terms 
address the problem of social groups not being able to participate in the 
new organisation of the world economies based on an "information 
currency." The predominant policies that seek to shape the future 
Internet are concerned with the inclusion of disinterested masses in a 
predetermined cybersociety that consists of the makings of corporate 
capitalism — defined by a marketplace, a bureaucracy and a school. In 
spite of the enormous amount of hyperbole and enthusiasm for this 
new world, it is the powers and values of the very "real," physical 
world that determine its future. National and global policy debates 
comprise of provisions for e–commerce, e–government and e–learning. 
E–commerce denotes a set of activities where individuals essentially 
participate in consumption exercises. Consumers are at the receiving 
end of transactions aiming to boost further increase in consumption. E–
governance aims at reducing the potential of individuals to directly 
interact with a "central" state by reducing access to administrative 
information. Digital forms of government information replace hard 
copy, making it difficult for some citizens to complete even the most 
basic forms and documents [4]. Further problems arise when state 
services are privatised, raising costs and excluding even more 
individuals and creating new forms of inequality. Moreover, even 
those citizens with access and skills are not actively incorporated into 
Internet–based decision–making processes. 
 
The narratives of social exclusion have come to replace any other 
analysis of the socio–economic aspects of Internet policies. Given that 
policies focus on consumerism and economics, specific social groups 
are unable to pursue the "fundamental" consuming activity of the 
information society. Hence, the digital divide is no longer about 
poverty and inequality but instead about skills needed to be consumers 
in an information society. Consequently, it masks social inequalities by 
"rebranding" poverty as "exclusion" and class as "divide." As Cameron 
and Palan (2004) remark, the "poor who have always been with us" 
become unwanted. Social exclusion places the responsibility of 
poverty on the shoulders of the disadvantaged and turns their inability, 
or unwillingness, to participate in the information society into a burden 
that deprives consuming societies from revenue. It furthermore reduces 
inequalities to technology–related inadequacies, mostly addressed as 
matters of skills and access. In Canadian policies, the digital divide is 
addressed as an obstacle to the vision of turning Canada the most wired 
country on the planet (Birdsall, 2000). Information is treated as the 
new capital and the information society incorporates the vision of a 
predominantly consumerist set of relations. However, as Guédon (2003) 
suggested, Internet users have created a communication society that 
revolves around the sharing of knowledge and the empowerment of 
citizens through the fostering of networks. This form of "society" does 
not treat social exclusion as a technological problem but seeks to 
address socio–economic inequalities within the broader context of 
social determinants. Civil society, and in particular organisations 
working for gender justice and human rights, consider the Millennium 
Development Goals and the Beijing Platform for Action as inseparable 
and interlinked projects that belong within the same broader context of 
combating the causes of social inequality (Venturelli and Queau, 2001; 
Gender Strategies Working Group, 2003). 
  
 
Conclusions 
If we seek a broad categorisation of ideological priorities in Internet 
and consequently information society policy, we can identify two 
overarching directions: predominantly market–directed and profit–
motivated policies, represented largely by American 
telecommunications and information industries [5], and those policies 
that examine social justice and wealth re- distribution. However, the 
shaping of the Internet through national and major international 
policies has increasingly concentrated on facilitating and protecting its 
commercial aspects, without at the same time protecting non–profit, 
civil activities as well as those rights that enhance citizenship. 
Furthermore, there is an increasing attention to measures that 
criminalise once widespread practices of information exchange 
initially developed by communities on the Internet. Indeed, new efforts 
to control private behaviour introduces a radical shift in Internet 
policies, protecting commercial and private interests in a public policy 
framework. In this process, the participation of civil society actors 
remains sketchy, while the private sector becomes an equal next to 
state. The preliminary outcomes of the first phase of the WSIS in 
Geneva reflect the technocratic approaches privileged by the 
dominating actors of the negotiations. The first phase has paid not 
enough attention to issues of wealth redistributive policies, while it 
tended to address social inequality in technological terms. These trends 
reduce the beneficial potential of this medium for individuals, 
enhancing instead its profitability for corporations.  
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Notes 
1. Group of Eight (G–8), 2000, point 7. 
2. Ibid. 
3. The shift tends to be toward a higher degree of tolerance of 
pornographic products (that should not be considered identical to 
sexually explicit material), through processes of mainstreaming of 
pornography in everyday life (Sarikakis, 2004). 
4. The variety of cases where problems have been created by the 
replacement of physical transactions by electronic ones is an 
underreported area. In Greece, self–assessment for tax purposes can 
only be submitted electronically, causing a number of problems for 
citizens without home Internet access. Also, see Warschauer (2002) for 
a discussion of further social and psychological effects of Internet–
imposed isolation among unemployed citizens in Ireland. 
5. Here we can also locate policies that are concerned with the 
maintenance of state/political control over citizens, while at the same 
time maintaining a pro–market attitude. China or Singapore are 
important countries, the former due to its market size and the latter due 
to its position in telematics and its geopolitical strategic position 
relative to southeast Asia. 
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